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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

State appeals from District Judge John R. Stegner' s Judgment
Respondent John Marr's conviction for felony domestic battery. Mr. Marr concurs with
Judge Stegner's findings and conclusions, which are well-supported in the record, and
requests that this Court affirm.
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings
1.

The Incident and Charges

On September 26, 2011, John Marr and his new wife, Marci Myva Jones, had a
dispute in a small apartment that they shared in Coeur d'Alene. There were no
witnesses to this event besides Mr. Marr and Ms. Jones, and the proceedings that would
follow turned on their respective versions of what happened.

It was Mr. Marr, not Ms. Jones, who called the police, and they responded to the
apartment at about 2:00 a.m. (State v. Marr, Appellate Docket No. 39918, Clerk's Record
on Appeal, p. 10.) They noticed that Ms. Jones had bruises on her neck, chest, and arms,
and that she had bloodshot eyes. (Id. at 11.) Mr. Marr had a bite mark on his left arm
that was bleeding, a red mark on his left cheek, and a scratch on his right forearm. (Id.
at 12.)
Officers took statements from both. (Docket No. 39918, Clerk's Rec., p. 12.) Ms.
Jones told officers that she had "been drinking all day." (Id. at 10.) She further said that

1

an
to
passed out. (Id.) She said that Mr. Marr also showed her a closed fist .... u~.,~ ....
if she "wanted one of these," and then punched her in the face. (Id. at 10.) She
1

claimed that she had bit Mr. Marr s arm to get him to release his hold on her. (Id. at 11.)
She also provided a nearly unintelligible written statement for the officers. (Id. at 15-16.)
Mr. Marr had a different version. He told the officers that he was trying to go to
sleep, but a drunken Ms. Jones continued to play loud music on the radio. (Docket No.
39918, Clerk's Rec., p. 11.) Mr. Marr confirmed that Ms. Jones had been drinking
heavily, which was not unusual for her. (Id.) When Mr. Marr asked her to turn the
volume down, she suddenly flew into a rage, became violent, and tried to punch him.
(Id.) He restrained her - the officer wrote that at one point Mr. Marr said he was on top

of her holding her down in a "modified choke hold" - and she bit him on the arm,
breaking the skin. (Id.) When asked how Ms. Jones's injuries occurred, he claimed that
they likely happened as he was trying to protect himself. (Id.) This was not the first
time, according to Mr. Marr, that Ms. Jones had hit him. (Id.)
Mr. Marr was arrested and charged with felony attempted strangulation and
domestic battery with a traumatic injury. (Docket No. 39918, Clerk's Rec., pp. 20-21.)
The Court appointed the Kootenai County Public Defender as his counsel. (Id. at p. 28.)

2

the

Ms. Jones's version of
to

she testified that Mr. Marr choked her "three to five times"

she

passed out each time. (Docket No. 39918, PH Tr., p. 5: In. 22-23.) Also, she claimed that
these choking-out incidents took place off-and-on over the course of "a couple of
"(Id.) And she no longer remembered whether Mr. Marr asked her if "she
wanted one of these" or punched her with a closed fist. (PH, p. 25: 14-19.)
Mr. Marr was bound over for trial on the two felony counts. (PH Tr., p. 27: 1011.) Deputy Public Defender Sarah L. Sears represented Marr after the preliminary
hearing. (Clerk's Rec., p. 34.)
2.

Ms. Sears's Pretrial Investigation

When Nls. Sears was assigned Mr. Marr' s case, she had been out of law school for
about six years. (Evidentiary Hearing Transcript ("EH Tr."), pp. 6: 17-21; 8: 12-13.) She
was responsible for felonies, misdemeanors, involuntary mental commitments, and
drug court. (Id. at 8: 15-25; 9: 1-15.) Her caseload averaged about 150 to 200 open cases
- maybe even more

which she has characterized as "really heavy." (Id.)

Mr. Marr was in custody for the entire time that his case was pending. (EH Tr.,
p. 78: 15-20.) According to him, Ms. Sears met with him at the jail only once, though he
was able to speak with her on the phone on a few other occasions, and he wrote letters
to her. (EH Tr., pp. 79: 19-23; 80: 6-8; 82: 8-10.) One of the Public Defender's

3

was also assigned the case.
one
atpp.

at

51:

or

: 1-2.)

Although Mr. Durant and to a lesser extent Ms. Sears

testified at the post-

conviction evidentiary hearing that Mr. Marr told them different details about the
incident with Ms. Jones over time, Mr. Marr was consistent on two main themes: Ms.
Jones was intoxicated and she was the instigator. (EH Tr., pp. 15: 20-25; 16: 1-2; 40: 4-22;
65: 4-21; 88: 7-10.) Mr. Marr also told both Ms. Sears and Mr. Durant, verbally and in
writing, that Marci Jones had a serious problem with alcohol, that she would become
aggressive when intoxicated, and that others in the community would support those
allegations. (EH Tr., pp. 15: 20-24; 16: 1-2; 64: 1-5; Petitioner's Evidentiary Hearing Ex.
A.) Based on his own knowledge, Mr. Durant agreed that Ms. Jones had a background
of intoxication with "violence peppered in there." (EH Tr., p. 56: 11-20.) He believed
that she was a "nasty drunk." (Id.)
An independent law enforcement officer who had interacted with Ms. Jones held
a similar opinion, though he was not contacted by the defense. Idaho State Police patrol
officer Donald Moore testified at the evidentiary hearing that he recalled Marci Jones
when he was member of the Bonners Ferry Police Department in 2004 and 2005.
Bonners Ferry is a small enough community that Officer Moore became familiar with its
through his work as a patrolman. (EH Tr., pp. 67: 22-25.) His opinion was
4

was
was
she was sober.

at 69:

Officer Moore had also discussed

Jones's behavior with others who had interacted with her in the community, and
when asked whether she had a reputation {/for beiligerence, for aggressiveness after
<linking to excess," he responded that, "she was known to be difficult, yes." (Id. at 76: 1-

While Ms. Sears was generally aware that Ms. Jones's criminal record contained
"misdemeanors related to drinking," she did not look into the circumstances of those
cases to determine whether they were factually similar to the present case. (EH Tr., p.
21: 2-8, 20-25.) The records containing the facts about Ms. Jones's rather extensive
misdemeanor criminal history, which included her own previous domestic violence
charges and convictions, could have been easily found in court records. (Exhibit B to
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Clerk's Record, pp. 27-58.)
Ms. Sears admitted at the evidentiary hearing that she did not investigate
whether any witnesses, such as Officer Moore, could offer an opinion at trial that Ms.
Jones had a character trait for becoming an aggressor while intoxicated. (EH Tr., pp. 19:
7-25; 20: 1-25; 22: 1-20.) Nor did she determine whether any additional witnesses might
be available testify that Ms. Jones had such a reputation in the community. (Id.) Ms.
Sears conceded that "it was pretty obvious that [Marci Jones J did have that
5

ff

at

When asked at the evidentiary hearing about

The Tury Trial
At trial, Ms. Jones testified again that Mr. Marr would not let her leave the
apartment and that she was standing by the sink when he suddenly choked her into
unconsciousness. (Docket No. 39918, Jury Trial Transcript ("JT Tr.")., pp. 65-68, 79-80.)
She claimed that Mr. Marr did this "two or three times" and that she eventually bit his
arm. (JT Tr., pp. 83: 5-8; 84: 4-5.) She admitted that she had a habit of drinking about six
beers a day for "the last couple of years," and that she had that much to drink on the
day of the argument. (JT Tr., p. 86: 5-9.) Notably, despite telling police officers that Mr.
Marr said "do you want one of these" before punching her in the face, she claimed at
trial that Mr. Marr did not punch her. (JT Tr., pp. 117: 11-19, 134: 2-4.)
In addition, although it was on Ms. Sears's "radar" that Ms. Jones may have been
drinking before she testified, Ms. Sears wholly failed to explore that fruitful area. (EH
Tr., pp. 24: 15-18.) Ms. Jones was mumbling her words, and Mr. Marr told her that Ms.
Jones was intoxicated. (EH Tr., pp. 24: 15-25; 25: 1-18.) Despite acknowledging that a
witness's intoxication is relevant to her credibility and her ability to recall past events,
Ms. Sears did not follow-up at all. (JT Tr., pp. 118: 9-22.)

1 Mr. Marr disagrees with the State's present interpretation in its Brief of what Ms. Sears meant when she
testified that she "missed" the issue (Brief of Appellant, pp. 13-14), which he will address in the argument
section.
6

was
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Ms. Jones very angry. (JT Tr. pp. 194: 24-25; 195: 1-21.) She then
1

"vicious and violent," strode across the room, and punched him in the side of the face.
(Id.) He caught her hand and they fell on the bed. (Id.) They struggled there

she was

"fighting like a crazy person" - when she bit him hard on his arm. (JT Tr., pp. 194-96,
210-11.) She then went into the bathroom and closed the door. (JT, pp. 196: 23-25.) Mr.
Marr eventually opened the door, carried Ms. Jones out, and called the police. (JT Tr, p.
197: 14-22.)
Presiding Judge Charles W. Hosak instructed the jury, among other matters, to
consider self-defense as a potential defense to the charges. (JT Tr., p. 220: 4-25.) The
jury returned a verdict of not guilty of attempted strangulation but guilty of domestic
battery with a traumatic injury. (Docket No. 39918, Clerk Rec., p. 121.)
Kootenai County District Judge John T. Mitchell conducted the sentencing
hearing. When Judge Mitchell asked if there were any errors in the presentence
investigation report, Mr. Marr responded with wide-ranging comments about the PSI,
his history, and the facts of the case, spanning over nearly 30 pages of transcript
without interruption from Ms. Sears. (Docket No. 39918, Sent. Tr., pp. 3-30.) Ms. Sears's
argument on Mr. Marr's behalf extends only a little over a page of the transcript, and
she made no specific recommendation to the Court other than to note that
7

to

8 years

fl

was

(Id. at 45: 20-25.)

Mr. Marr' s appeal was unsuccessful, and he filed a Petition for Post-Conviction
, .. _.. ~,. daiming that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial (Claim I)
and at the sentencing hearing (Claim II). (Clerk's Record, pp. 6-13.) The case was
reassigned to Judge Stegner in the Second Judicial District. Judge Stegner denied the
State's Motion for Summary Dismissal and held an evidentiary hearing. He later issued
a memorandum opinion concluding that Mr. Marr had established his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial (Claim I). (Clerk's Record, pp. 101-30.) The State
now appeals.

The State notes that Judge Mitchell called Mr. Marr "delusional" before sentencing him. Of course, Judge
Mitchell was not the trial judge and was not present when Ms. Jones testified so that he could weigh her
demeanor or credibility.
2
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Introduction

This was a close case in which the jury acquitted John Marr of attempted
strangulation but convicted him of felony domestic battery. The jury had no knowledge
that Ms. Jones had a trait of hostile behavior while intoxicated, which would have
supported Mr. Marr's claim that he was repelling an attack from her. Contrary to the
State's claims, trial counsel's failure to investigate and develop that evidence was based
on her ignorance of the law and lack of diligence, and it was objectively unreasonable.
Had she conducted a reasonable investigation, she would have uncovered Trooper
Moore's testimony, which would have been admissible at trial. Had that evidence been
presented, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.
2.

Standard of Review

In a post-conviction matter, this Court defers to the District Court's findings of
fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494, 495-96, 975 P.3d
782, 783-84 (1999). This Court then exercises free review over the District Court's
application of law to those facts. (Id.)

9
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States Constitution, applicable to the states through

Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). He also had a
concomitant right under Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. lvlurray v. State, 156
Idaho 159,164,321 P.3d 709, 714 (2014).
The test for determining whether the defendant has been deprived of that
constitutional right is two-fold: first, he must show that his counsel committed errors
that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and, second, he must
demonstrate that he suffered actual prejudice as a result of those errors. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984); accord Johnson v. State, 156 Idaho 7, 10-11, 319
P.3d 491, 494-95 (2014). Prejudice in this context means that, but for counsel's errors,
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. Strickland,
466 U.S at 694. A reasonable probability is one that is "sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Id.

10

correctly determined that Mr. Marr had satisfied the first part
of the Strickland test when he established that his trial counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. This conclusion has a solid basis in the
factual record.
Initially, when this case was assigned to Attorney Sears, the facts set up a clear
to investigate a possible claim of self-defense and to develop any evidence that
may support that defense. This is so because Ms. Sears knew, or reasonably should have
known, two critical things from the police reports and the preliminary hearing: (1)
Marci Jones had documented injuries that would need to be explained, and (2) John
Marr had already made a statement in which he admitted engaging in physical contact
with Ms. Jones but claimed that he was restraining her and defending himself.
This need became even more acute after trial counsel discussed the case with her
client. She freely admitted at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing that Mr. Marr told
her "all of the time" that Ms. Jones had a problem with aggressive conduct while she
was under the influence of alcohol. (EH Tr., pp. 15: 20-24; 16: 1-2.) He informed her that
others in the community could prove that trait. (EH Tr., Exhibit A.) Though his
comments to her about the dispute with Ms. Jones varied in some respects during the
case, trial counsel has testified that he "never wavered in his innocence." (EH

11

40:

more,
to
u

....... ~ L

was also aware of Ms. Jones's character and background.

The Idaho Rules of Evidence have long permitted a defendant who claims selfto introduce evidence that would tend to show that an alleged victim was the
initial aggressor. The most obvious example is evidence establishing a character trait for
aggressive or violent conduct. State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 584, 990 P.2d 742, 750
(Ct. App. 1999). Specifically, while Rule 404(a) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence generally
excludes character evidence, an exception is available for "[e ]vidence of a pertinent trait
of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused." I.R.E. 404(a)(2). This
exception exists because an alleged victim's character trait for violent and aggressive
behavior makes a fact in dispute - whether the victim was the initial aggressor - more
likely. Hernandez, 133 Idaho at 584, 990 P.2d at 750; State v. Custodio, 136 Idaho 197, 30
975 (Ct. App. 2001). Character evidence of this sort may be proven by opinion and
reputation testimony. I.R.E. 405(a).
Here, counsel has conceded that she did not conduct any investigation to
determine whether evidence could be developed to show that Ms. Jones was the initial
aggressor in this case. (EH Tr., p. 21: 2-8.) Had she done so, she could have easily found
and interviewed Trooper Moore, for instance, who is listed as the arresting and

12

County

cases on

State characterizes Ms. Sears's candid admission that she
missed" this issue as relating only to the review of a certain police report. (Brief of
Appellant pp. 13-14.) This Court should not be persuaded. The District Court found, as
a factual matter, that Ms. Sears overlooked the larger issue of an investigation into
potential witnesses who could testify about Ms. Jones' s character trait for belligerent
and hostile conduct while drunk, and that she did not make a tactical or strategic
decision when she did so. (Clerk's Record, p. 117.) That finding is amply supported by
the record and is not clearly erroneous.
The colloquy that led her to admit that she "just missed that" began with her
admission that she did not recall investigating the factual basis underlying Ms. Jones' s
previous convictions. (EH Tr., p. 21: 2-8, 20-25.) It is true that, as an example, she cited a
police report attached to the post-conviction petition that contained facts in a different
case that were strikingly similar to what Mr. Marr reported had happened in this case.
(EH Tr., p. 21: 5-25.) Referring to that report, she remarked that she may have been able
to use the factual information in her cross-examination of Ms. Jones. (Id.) But her answer
was non-responsive to the original question, which asked her about the rules governing
opinion and reputation evidence in self-defense cases, and it reveals that she simply did
not know those rules. (EH, Tr., pp. 22:21-25; 23:1; 23:8-22.) Her ignorance on this point is

13

testimony
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can
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someone

necessarily helpful to us." (EH

someone

if

p. 43: 4-11.) In other words, she

misunderstood that it was not Ms. Jones' s status as an alcoholic that was relevant; it was
a trait for unpredictable aggressive conduct while using alcohol - a "nasty drunk" - would
relevant.
In any event, the State's argument is a red herring. Even if trial counsel was
referring to her failure to use a single police report, the remainder of her testimony
nonetheless establishes that she did not conduct any investigation into the larger issue.
As found by the District Court, the record shows that despite Ms. Sears's basic
awareness that Ms. Jones had an extensive misdemeanor criminal history peppered
with a serious drinking problem, "she did not interview a single person about Jones's
character or reputation for being belligerent while intoxicated." (Clerk's Record, p. 117;
citing EH Tr., pp. 19: 7-25; 20: 1-25; 22: 1-20.) Counsel testified that she did not make a
tactical or strategic decision, (EH, Tr., p. 43: 23-25; 44: 1-6), but if she did make some
type of "decision," it was based on ignorance of the relevant law. (EH Tr., p. 43: 4-11.)
This Court can safely affirm the District Court's finding on this point.
The State further contends that trial counsel could not be ineffective because
Trooper Moore's testimony would not have been admissible. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 79.) The District Court found otherwise, and this Court should likewise.
14
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Moore testified that he had an independent recollection of
Jones' s behavior even several years after his interactions with her. He noted that she
was a docile and compiiant person while sober but that in his opinion she was "very
belligerent" and "physically resistant" after drinking. (EH Tr., p. 69: 6-25; 70: 1-4.)
While it is true he did not immediately agree with a description of her belligerent
response to his orders as "aggressive" (Id. at 69: 12-15), when later asked whether she
had a reputation in the community "for belligerence, for aggressiveness after she had
drinking to excess," he responded "she was known to be very difficult, yes." (EH
p. 76: 1-7.)(Emphasis added.)
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401. All relevant evidence is generally
admissible unless otherwise prohibited by the Rules of Evidence. I.R.E. 402.
The State contends that Trooper Moore's opinion that Ms. Jones was "very
belligerent" and "physically resistant," and his agreement that she a reputation for
"belligerence, for aggressiveness after drinking to excess," did not show a character trait
that was relevant to first aggressor status or self-defense in this case. This argument
should not be credited. Trooper Moore had seen Ms. Jones both drunk and sober,

15

day. "Belligerent" and
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among other things, as, of warlike character; aggressively hostile;
ti
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http://www.dictionary.com/browse/belligerent (last accessed November 29, 2016). The
gist of Trooper 1v1oore' s opinion was that Ms. Jones was hostile and combative while
drunk. It is not stretch to find that a hostile or combative person with a police officer
while drunk is also more likely to engage in sudden and unpredictable aggressive or
violent behavior while drunk.
It follows that Trooper Moore's testimony about Ms. Jones's conduct and

character had a tendency to make facts of consequence in this matter - whether she
attacked Mr. Marr while she was drunk and whether he used self-defense to repel such
an attack- more probable than without that evidence. The evidence was relevant and
admissible. For the reasons that follow, there is at least a reasonable probability that the
evidence was weighty enough to tip the scales toward a full acquittal.
5.

Given Ms. Tones' s serious credibility problems, trial counsel's errors
prejudiced Mr. Marr' s right to a fair trial

This was not an overwhelming case of guilt in which no additional evidence
would have made a difference. Marci Jones had serious credibility problems. She
changed her story from her initial police statement to the preliminary hearing to the
trial. Initially, she mentioned only one choking incident and claimed that Mr. Marr
punched her

the face after asking her whether she "wanted one of these." Later, the
16
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course

was

statements

were vague and shifting.
There is no doubt that Ms. Jones had documented injuries. The State makes much
Ms. Jones's eye hemorrhaging and provides full-page color photographs attached to
brief for this Court's review. Rather than support the notion that these injuries
somehow mean that there could be no prejudice to Mr. Marr from his counsel's errors,
they instead support the opposite conclusion. The prosecution's theory at trial rested
heavily on the alleged strangulation aspect of this event. The State's case was based
on Ms. Jones' s incredible claims of being choked out multiple times over a
lengthy period, and it offered medical testimony that eye hemorrhaging can be
attributable to choking. But the jury apparently disbelieved those claims, because Mr.
Marr was acquitted of attempted strangulation. This is true despite the photographs of
Ms. Jones' s serious eye hemorrhaging that the State provides.
Mr. Marr' s guilt or innocence on the domestic battery charge hung in the
balance. The defense offered no context to support his testimony that Ms. Jones
unpredictably and violently attacked him, and that her injuries, even eye injuries, may
have been the result of a reasonable use of force in response. A witness who could
testify that Ms. Jones had that kind of character would have provided the necessary

17
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to

or fall solely on the character trait evidence,

overlooks the District Court's additional basis for relief. The District Court further
determined that trial counsel was also ineffective in failing to cross-examine Ms. Jones
about whether she was intoxicated the day that she testified against Mr. Marr. (Clerk's
Record, pp. 121-23.) Mr. Marr repeatedly told his trial counsel that Ms. Jones had a
serious drinking problem. Ms. Jones "mumbled" her words while testifying, and Mr.
Marr told his counsel that she was drunk. Despite acknowledging that a witness's
intoxication is relevant and may affect her ability to recall events accurately, trial
counsel failed to follow up after a single question about the last time that Ms. Jones had
had anything to drink. The jury should have been made aware of the high likelihood
that she was then under the influence, which would have eroded her already shaky
credibility.
The lower court did not have confidence in the fairness and outcome of this case.

It concluded that, but for counsel's errors, there was a reasonable probability of a
different result. That was a reasonable conclusion that should not be disturbed.

18

CONCLUSION
that
are not dearly erroneous, and affirm its legal conclusion
was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Respectfuliy submitted on this 30th day of November, 2016.

Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

on
of November, 2016, by depositing copies in the United States Mail, postage
and addressed to:

KENNETH K. JORGENSON
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0100
JOHNJ.MARR
#103124
PO Box 14
Boise ID 83707
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